

# Wide Angle Shot: Pyrrhic victory on ECB rates, TPI as "hidden" Eurobonds?

In July, ECB opened a new chapter in its monetary policy. After eight years, negative rates policy has come to an end. For the third time in history a bold 50bp hike was delivered plus further determined hikes were announced. Attention is drawn to a new government bond purchase programme TPI, which is supposed to prevent (strong) increases in yields of (indebted) euro countries. We think markets will challenge the ECB ... maybe also courts.




## Historic ECB day for several reasons

21 July 2022 could go down as a historic day in the history of the European Central Bank (ECB) and the euro.

- Firstly, ECB has completed the **exit** from the **negative interest rate policy** that has characterized the money market with exceptionally low/negative nominal interest rates since 2014 (in contrast to the USA). Later, "compensation mechanisms" and much need for corrections in the banking sector became necessary. With the end of negative interest rates, the legacy of Mario Draghi's monetary policy was also partially laid to rest, on the very day he failed as Italian prime minister.

## Key rates Europe & US (%) Current (expected) cycle and past cycles



Refinitiv, RBI/Raiffeisen Research

\* expected rate hikes ECB 250bp, US 375 bp; GFC = Global Financial Crisis

- Historic ECB day for several reasons* **1**
- Only third interest rate hike cycle in euro history* **2**
- ECB under (global) pressure to act* **3**
- Accelerated interest rate journey upwards* **3**
- ECB leaves end of the interest rate cycle open* **4**
- First success: inflation expectations and financial markets react positively* **4**
- TPI: QE in a hiking cycle - market and legal test to come* **4**
- Now three QE programmes to choose from* **5**
- Fighting symptoms instead of causes - the example of Italy* **6**
- Strategic victory of the "doves" over the "hawks"?* **6**
- Disclaimer* **7**
- Analyst* **10**

**Gunter DEUBER**

Analyst Editor

+43 1 71707-5707

gunter.deuber@rbinternational.com

**Peter BREZINSCHKE**

Analyst Editor

+43 1 71707-1517


peter.brezinschek@rbinternational.com

This report is intended for replacement@bluematrix.com. Unauthorized distribution of this report is prohibited.

- Secondly, it was **only the third time** in history that ECB raised interest rates **by 50bp**. The last time for such a move was two decades ago (April 2000). Usually, ECB has implemented rate hikes of 25bp. The ECB is traditionally a less activist central bank than, say, the US Fed, with usually a different "reaction function".
- Thirdly, 21 July will most likely mark the **beginning of a longer-lasting process of interest rate normalisation**, after a special phase of monetary policy non-reaction in Europe and the partial decoupling from international key interest rate trends in the last decade. The end of the current interest rate policy journey was — deliberately — left open by ECB President Christine Lagarde. Not only did the negative interest rate policy come to an end on 21 July, but also the interest rate policy "promises" or **forward guidance** that were used extensively under Mario Draghi. Under its new head Lagarde, the ECB had long been more hesitant to make too many forward commitments. Now the ECB chief dared to turn around her forward guidance within days. Interestingly, this all points to **more data-driven monetary policy decisions** at the ECB and thus **more interest rate and capital market volatility**.
- Fourthly, it is all the more astonishing that the ECB wants to **(permanently) limit the structurally increasing interest rate** and financial market fluctuations in the euro area with **a new government bond purchase instrument, the TPI** (Transmission Protection Instrument). Here again, special correction mechanisms seem to be introduced through the back door.

Like us, President Christine Lagarde described the latest ECB meeting in July as historic. Her argument refers to the **unanimity** of all 25 Council members **on the core decisions**. The superficial unanimity should not obscure how different the interests of the national central bank presidents, but also of the ECB Executive Board, are. The fact that a unanimous decision was reached is probably due to the willingness of the **"doves" and "hawks"** in the ECB Governing Council **to compromise**. For in themselves, the two core decisions (significant interest rate tightening, TPI) are contradictory.

#### Key rates euro area & US (%)



BIS, RBI/Raiffeisen Research

#### Only third interest rate hike cycle in euro history


We are now looking ahead to the **third rate hike cycle in the history** of the ECB. The first was from November 1999 to October 2000, the second from December 2005 to 2008. Interestingly, the rate hike cycles ended after **225bp**. However, the starting level was clearly in positive territory at 2.5% (1999) and 2.0% (2005) and significantly higher than now. Given these "flat" monetary policy cycles, the latest **50bp rate hike** to start with is **remarkable**. As recently as 9 June and in the "old thinking" of pre-fixing, Ms Lagarde announced in the press conference an interest rate move of 25bp for July, possibly 50bp then in September. But ECB had to take note that the inflation path from May (8.1%) to June (8.6%) has unexpectedly increased again. In addition, the ECB was increasingly the focus of criticism for having underestimated inflation for a long time when it was at its

highest level in 50 years. Meanwhile, other central banks around the world have already taken strong steps to raise interest rates and have announced further measures. The US Federal Reserve has already put its money where its mouth is with 225bp of hikes so far (incl. the 75bp as of July 27).

### ECB under (global) pressure to act

In this environment, ECB had to follow suit, because central banks do not act in a vacuum, but **influence** each other, among other things **through international interest rate and exchange rate** channels. Since the euro has lost 17% of its value against the USD in the last 18 months, a strong interest rate signal was also needed to stabilise the exchange rate or to **focus on fighting inflation**. As energy and commodity prices are traded in USD, the significant depreciation of the euro has pushed up energy prices in the euro area far more than in the US or China. Imported inflation puts an additional burden on companies and consumers alike via the exchange rate effect, while the lower euro exchange rate has hardly any stimulating effect in the current global economic environment. ECB has no influence on energy prices, but in coordination with the Federal Reserve's monetary policy it can influence the exchange rate. The ECB's long extremely expansionary stance by international standards played a significant role (alongside economic and political risks) in the euro's depreciation.

### Key rates euro area & global perspective (%)



BIS, RBI/Raiffeisen Research

\* Average USA, Canada, Australia, Switzerland, Sweden

### Accelerated interest rate journey upwards

With the latest interest rate move, ECB has made a U-turn towards prioritising inflation. The Governing Council's updated assessment of inflation risks suggests that even **more such 50bp rate hikes** should be decided at the upcoming meeting(s) in the course of 2022. For the September meeting in particular, the Governing Council has already indirectly committed itself: On September 9, **new ECB economic projections** will be published, and there is a high need for revisions in the light of the "current" June projections (HICP 2022: +6.8%, 2023: +3.5% and 2024: +2.1%). We already see the increasing pressure on the core inflation rate much more critically than the ECB — at least according to its previous forecasts. And since Christine Lagarde has abolished forward guidance and **monetary policy decisions** are **data-dependent** and reassessed month by month as well as influenced by the ECB's quarterly inflation projections, a striking rate hike in September is not a bold announcement. The upcoming economic forecasts in December could bring further upward revisions to inflation estimates.

## ECB leaves end of the interest rate cycle open

ECB chief Lagarde has left **open how far the interest rate journey** will go upwards. The question of the **neutral interest rate**, which has neither an expansionary nor a restrictive effect on the economy and price formation, is still disputed in the ECB Council. It is probably currently set at plus/minus 1.5%. However, Christine Lagarde indicated at the July press conference that demographics and productivity could move the neutral interest rate slightly upwards in the future or that it could be more in the range of 1.5-2%. As stated, the two rate hike cycles in ECB's history so far have brought a total rate increase of 225bp each. This is at least a good indication for the current interest rate journey, which **we expect to be as high as 250bp**. Given the current record inflation, a **shorter time horizon to target** can be assumed than in the past. Moreover, the current inflation environment may force the ECB — if we avoid a deep recession in Europe — to initially raise the key rate into the **slightly restrictive range** or at least to the upper edge of the neutral interest rate range in 2023, with inflation risks weighted higher.

Since ECB has long underestimated the persistence of inflation and is now reacting late, significant interest rate hikes are necessary. This is because the effective **time lag of conventional monetary policy measures** until the price formation process (in contrast to unconventional direct market control) takes a long time, i.e. 6 to 18 months, and this is especially true in the bank-financed euro area. Thus, it is also clear that this first step will have virtually no impact on the inflation rate in the coming months. Interest rate hikes in 2022 will have a dampening effect on prices in the course of 2023 at the earliest. But with its energetic first interest rate step and announced further ones in this tone, ECB wants to keep **second-round effects in check**. There is also great urgency to do so, as the European labour market is extremely robust despite stagflationary tendencies. Wage increases for 2023 will be substantial. In Austria, we expect wage agreements that could have a six before the decimal point.

### First success: inflation expectations and financial markets react positively

In anticipation of a tighter monetary policy by the ECB with a commitment to the mandate of price stability, **inflation expectations** on the financial market have **fallen back to the 2%** price target mark since the press conference on 21 July. This is the lowest level since the beginning of March 2022. As inflation expectations are an important input factor for monetary policy assessments, this can be chalked up as a success. A firming above the 2% mark, as already achieved in May 2022 with 2.5%, would have a negative impact on the wage-pricing process and make it more difficult to fight inflation. Financial markets (EUR/USD, stock markets, bond markets) have otherwise reacted to the ECB turnaround in a rather restrained to slightly positive manner. The widening of the **yield differential** between **German and Italian 10-year government bonds** to 240 basis points has occurred primarily due to the German yield decline, which Italy was only insufficiently able to follow due to the current government crisis. What we would like to emphasize is that we now see a prolonged period of market uncertainty regarding ECB's interest rate path. Ultimately, many market observers are asking themselves **how far the ECB** will get in the **interest rate policy cycle** before cyclical risks dominate and how much normalization a (tacit) **pact between hawks** (restrictive interest rate policy) **and doves** (expansionary monetary policy, cushioning interest rate hikes) in the ECB Governing Council will allow for.

### TPI: QE in a hiking cycle - market and legal test to come

And this brings another key decision of the ECB Governing Council to the fore: the announcement of a **new instrument TPI** (Transmission Protection Instrument). Whether the new name — previously there was talk of an anti-fragmentation instrument — reflects the intentions of the spread limits is to be judged rather skeptically. The new name conjured out of a hat is supposed to suggest that it is "only" about safeguarding monetary policy transmission, not about capital market fragmentation in the euro

area. Nevertheless, it is interesting that **with the announcement** of the much-needed **normalization of monetary policy**, a **new "crisis instrument" is simultaneously launched** and/or an implicit continuation of quantitative easing is pursued in order to perpetuate government bond purchases (beyond reinvestments from existing bond purchase programmes). One must critically question this instrument for several reasons.

- A **government bond purchase programme** is a one-sided **instrument of expansionary monetary policy** or serves to raise inflation expectations. It is therefore inconsistent with a cycle of interest rate hikes in the face of inflation risks. The additional money creation would have to be neutralised and/or the government bond holdings in the ECB balance sheet would have to remain constant - which is currently not foreseeable or practicable.
- Virtually **no hard conditions** have been formulated for eligible states. The **ECB** will also not publish the criteria and wants to **decide on TPI use alone**. Only four vague general formulas have been mentioned by President Lagarde: Compliance with EU fiscal rules, no severe economic imbalances, sustainability of public budgets and sound and sustainable economic policies. The door is wide open to the scope for assessment. In any case, critics can be expected to sue, regardless of how and to what extent the TPI will/must be used. We think that **lawsuits** may well result in higher ex-ante transparency and accountability obligations for the ECB. The latter are the anchor of central bank independence and should also be observed by ECB.
- The TPI is activated when **"unwarranted, disorderly market dynamics"** set in. What is meant by this? Who and which institution presumes to know which yield differentials between states are "fundamentally" justified? Here, too, arbitrariness is to be feared. Especially since, as already discussed, yield differentials are a complex interplay of many fundamental and/or political factors. In this respect, we expect the **market to test ECB**. This is also because the ECB under its current leadership does not have the nimbus of market control as it did under Mario Draghi, and there is certainly the threat of some political volatility in Italy in the further course of the year.
- Since the **TPI** can be used **without limits** (time, volume) and there are no exit criteria, the ECB is **close to** the border of **monetary public finance**. For this reason, too, we see high risks of legal action. A limitation in terms of time and/or content to special phases in monetary policy would have been more expedient than a non-limitation - also taking into account the risk of lawsuits. Critical market observers see the TPI as a **de facto** introduction of **Eurobonds** through the back door, an interpretation that should not remain hidden from the German Federal Constitutional Court.

### Now three QE programmes to choose from

According to the press text and statements by Christine Lagarde, the **TPI** joins the quantitative measures as **third instrument**. The flexible **re-investments** of the PEPP (Pandemic Emergency Purchase Program) remain the main instrument for capital market steering. In addition, the less popular **conditional OMT** (Outright Monetary Transactions) is (for the time being) **pushed into insignificance** by the TPI. If Mario Draghi's OMT programme was already called "Fat Berta" in 2012, the TPI is (for the time being) even more powerful! It is possible that with the benefit of hindsight the ECB's turnaround in interest rate policy in July 2022 will be a **Pyrrhic victory** for the **"hawks"** in the ECB Governing Council — from the mostly budget-stable countries, where the interest rate turnaround was partly "celebrated". For a **faster and more or less unavoidable normalization of interest rates**, which was necessary anyway, the **unlimited TPI** was apparently **installed in exchange**. We think a timing and volume limitations would have been justifiable and possibly less short-sighted. A later conceivable judicial containment of the ECB should not be conducive to the credibility of the institution and financial market stability.

## Fighting symptoms instead of causes - the example of Italy

Once again it becomes clear that the **ECB can fight symptoms** (rising yields) with ever new instruments, but the **causes lie far beyond its sphere of influence**. Italy, for example, does not primarily have a budget and debt problem, but a **growth and productivity problem**. Since 2007, Germany (with strong immigration!) has recorded an increase in GDP/capita of +10.1%, Italy a decline of -8.8%! Italy is also paradoxically helped more by solid rate hikes than by lax monetary policy in an inflationary environment. The more the ECB raises its key rates, the more long-term inflation expectations remain close to the 2% price target. The first success since the ECB meeting has become visible in this. As a result, capital market yields rise less than with lax monetary policy because the inflation premium is priced lower in bond yields. At times in recent months, the inflation premium in the euro capital market has been 0.5% (with inflation expectations of 2.5%). As confidence in a vigorous fight against inflation and its success increases, long-term capital market yields are significantly lower. Since Italy secures its financing needs on the capital market and not on the money market, vigorous interest rate hikes are **not per se counterproductive** for countries **with high financing needs**.

## Strategic victory of the "doves" over the "hawks"?

Overall, the "doves" in the ECB Governing Council have **probably won a strategic victory over the "hawks"**. A more or less unavoidable accelerated interest rate path (supporting structurally lower market yields) as well as the TPI suit the fiscally weak euro states. The incentives for responsible budgetary policy at the national level have again fallen by the wayside. Instead, **TPI** allows for a **limitation of financial market warning signals** regarding national economic policies. The use of the unloved OMT and ESM (in an extreme scenario, debt restructuring would be possible here) is not foreseeable. Moreover, in times of high inflation, a competition of populist money spending is now to be feared. Thus, we see the euro continuing to be burdened. Especially since we think that the TPI will still bring some legal repercussions and need for clarification — which the "hawks" in the ECB Governing Council may be counting on. We think that the **financial markets will test ECB** in the coming months to see how much interest rate and capital market volatility it is willing to allow — which is what has been put forward ... and now shall be once again limited through the back door with the (unlimited) TPI.

## Disclosure

### Risk notifications and explanations

#### Warnings:

- Figures on performance refer to the past. Past performance is not a reliable indicator for future results and the development of a financial instrument, a financial index or a securities service. This is particularly true in cases when the financial instrument, financial index or securities service has been offered for less than 12 months. In particular, this very short comparison period is not a reliable indicator for future results.
- Performance of a financial instrument, a financial index or a securities service is reduced by commissions, fees and other charges, which depend on the individual circumstances of the investor.
- The return on an investment in a financial instrument, a financial or securities service can rise or fall due to exchange rate fluctuations.
- Forecasts of future performance are based purely on estimates and assumptions. Actual future performance may deviate from the forecast. Consequently, forecasts are not a reliable indicator for future results and the development of a financial instrument, a financial index or a securities service.

A description of the concepts and methods used in the preparation of financial analyses is available under: [www.raiffeisenresearch.com/concept\\_and\\_methods](http://www.raiffeisenresearch.com/concept_and_methods).

Detailed information on sensitivity analyses (procedure for checking the stability of potential assumptions made in the context of financial analyses) is available under: [www.raiffeisenresearch.com/sensitivity\\_analysis](http://www.raiffeisenresearch.com/sensitivity_analysis).

Disclosure of circumstances and interests which may jeopardise the objectivity of RBI: [www.raiffeisenresearch.com/disclosuresobjectivity](http://www.raiffeisenresearch.com/disclosuresobjectivity)

Detailed information on recommendations concerning financial instruments or issuers disseminated during a period of 12 month prior to this publication (acc. to Art. 4 (1) i) Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2016/958 of 9.3.2016) is available under: [https://www.raiffeisenresearch.com/web/rbi-research-portal/recommendation\\_history](https://www.raiffeisenresearch.com/web/rbi-research-portal/recommendation_history).

### IMPORTANT LEGAL NOTICE

By opening and/or using the information, services, links, functions, applications or programmes (hereinafter: "contents") offered on this website, the user hereby agrees to be bound by the terms and conditions set out below:

#### Copyright law

The contents offered on this website and subsites (hereinafter: the "RBI Research-Website") are protected by copyright law. The downloading or storage of applications or programmes contained on the RBI Research-Website and the (complete or partial) reproduction, transmission, modification or linking of the contents of the RBI Research-Website shall only be permitted with the express and written consent of Raiffeisen Bank International AG ("RBI").

#### Information content, timeliness of information

The contents of the RBI Research-Website you are seeking to access is for information only and does neither qualify as investment advice nor constitute or form part of any offer to buy or sell any securities or other financial instruments as defined in Article 5 para 1 number 15 of EU Directive 2014/65 ("MiFID II") in any jurisdiction or jurisdictions, (and must not be considered in any way as an offer or sale in relation to any securities or other financial instrument). In particular, no securities have been or will be registered under the United States Securities Act of 1933, as amended (the "Securities Act"), and no such securities may be offered or sold in the United States absent registration or exemption from registration under the Securities Act.

RBI has made every effort to ensure reliability in researching the information published on the RBI Research-Website or sent via RBI Research-Website as well as in selecting the source of information used. Nonetheless, RBI does not assume any liability whatsoever

for the correctness, completeness, timeliness or uninterrupted availability of the information made available on the RBI Research-Website or as regards the sources of information used.

The information contained on the RBI Research-Website as well as forecasts published on the RBI Research-Website are based on the information available and the market assessment at the point in time stated in the respective publications. Certain information on this website constitutes forward-looking statements. RBI does not assume and hereby as far as possible expressly excludes any liability for the correctness, completeness or actual occurrence of the events described in the forward-looking statements. Such statements are not guarantees of future performance and involve a number of risks, uncertainties and assumptions. Certain financial data (e.g. stock exchange prices) may in some cases only be published after a certain interval of time has lapsed as defined by the data vendor (usually about 15 minutes or previous day end-of-day quotes). Furthermore, please note that many of the times are given in Greenwich Mean Time (GMT).

You agree and acknowledge that the information and statements contained in the materials you are accessing on the RBI Research-Website speak only as of the date of such document and such information and statements will become inaccurate, stale and/or out-of-date thereafter. These materials should not be relied upon at any time for any investment decision.

RBI assumes no responsibility to maintain documents posted on the RBI Research-Website or to update any documents. Therefore, users of the RBI Research-Website acknowledge that the content of documents available on the RBI Research-Website may not show the most recent scenarios, analysis or conclusions.

### **Restricted access due to local regulations**

Users of the RBI Research-Website can access some documents and information without registration requirements and without further barriers (the respective area on the RBI Research-Website is hereinafter referred to as "Unrestricted Area"). By accessing the Unrestricted Area, you agree and acknowledge that the materials on the RBI Research-Website may lawfully be made available in accordance with the laws of the jurisdiction in which you are located.

Other documents are only available to persons who have registered themselves in accordance with the required procedure. The part of the RBI Research-Website which can only be accessed by way of registration is hereinafter referred to as "Restricted Area").

Due to the laws applicable in some jurisdictions or regulations imposed by capital market or securities authorities, some of the information published on the RBI Research-Website (e.g. stock analyses) is not addressed to private individuals. In order to ensure the enforcement of such local access restrictions, RBI retains the right to take any (technical) measures it may deem suitable for restricting such information or segments of information subject to the aforementioned restrictions. The passing on of information contained on the RBI Research-Website, which is subject to local access restrictions valid in certain countries, to the persons stated in the relevant restrictions may constitute a breach of securities law or of other laws of said countries.

The distribution or dissemination of information published on the RBI Research-Website as well as the purchase and offering of the respective products in certain jurisdictions may be subject to restrictions or additional requirements. Persons who retrieve such information from the RBI Research-Website or into whose possession such information comes are required to inform themselves about and to observe such restrictions. In particular, the products to which such information published on the RBI Research-Website refers, may generally not be purchased or held by U.S. persons (the term "U.S. person" refers to any legal/natural person having its seat/residence in the U.S.A and any other person within the meaning given to it by Regulation S under the Securities Act 1933 as amended).

Users of the Unrestricted Area should be aware that the documents available on this part of the RBI Research-Website are not made available on the basis that any customer relationship is created between RBI and such user solely on the basis of such user having access to the respective documents. The documents available in the Unrestricted Area are intended to be available to users in the European Economic Area and in the United Kingdom.

### **Links to websites or URLs of third-party providers**

With the exception of the cases regulated under § 17 of the Austrian E-Commerce Act, RBI does not assume any liability for the content of websites or URLs of other providers to which links are provided. Neither does RBI assume any liability for the uninterrupted availability or full functionality of the links to websites or URLs of third parties.

### **Exclusion of liability**

RBI makes no warranty and will accept no liability for any damages whatsoever (including consequential or indirect damages, or lost profits) relating to the access to the RBI Research-Website, the opening, use or querying of the contents on the RBI Research-Website or relating to the links set up on the RBI Research-Website to websites or URLs of third parties. This applies also in cases in which RBI points out the possibility of incurring such damages.

Furthermore, RBI shall not be liable for technical disruptions such as server breakdowns, operating disruptions or failures of the telecommunications links and other similar events, which could lead to the (temporary) unavailability of the RBI Research-Website as a whole or parts of it.

### **Storage of registration data**

The content in the Restricted Area of the RBI Research-Website is only available to registered users. By sending the completed online registration form, the user confirms the completeness and correctness of the data given and also confirms having truthfully answered the questions asked. Furthermore, by sending the completed online form, the user hereby declares his or her consent to the electronic processing of his or her registration data by RBI for both internal banking organisational purposes and for transmission to other credit institutions within the Raiffeisen Banking Group, which may in turn also process, pass on or use such data.

### **Changes to the RBI Research-Website**

RBI retains the right to change and to remove the RBI Research-Website at any time (if necessary also without prior notice), in particular as regards changing existing contents (in full or in part) and adding new contents.

### **General terms and conditions of business**

For (authorised) users who use the services of RBI provided on the RBI Research-Website, the General Terms and Conditions of Business, as amended, of RBI shall apply in addition to the terms and conditions of this Disclaimer.

Please also take note of the general information provided pursuant to § 5 of the E-Commerce Act!

Thomas Sternbach Legal and Compliance Raiffeisen Bank International AG Am Stadtpark 9, 1030 Wien Tel: +43-1-71707-1541 Fax: +43-1-71707-761541 thomas.sternbach@rbinternational.com

**IF YOU CANNOT SO CERTIFY, YOU MUST CLICK THE BUTTON LABELLED "I DECLINE" OR OTHERWISE EXIT THIS WEBSITE.**

**BY ACCESSING THE MATERIALS ON THIS WEBSITE, YOU SHALL BE DEEMED TO HAVE MADE THE ABOVE REPRESENTATIONS AND CONSENTED TO DELIVERY BY ELECTRONIC TRANSMISSION.**

## AARON ALBER

📍 Austria  ,  
 ✉️ [aaron.alber@rbinternational.com](mailto:aaron.alber@rbinternational.com)

## CASPER ENGELEN

📍 Austria  ,  
 ✉️ [casper.engelen@rbinternational.com](mailto:casper.engelen@rbinternational.com)

## MATTHIAS REITH

📍 Austria  ,  
 ✉️ [matthias.reith@rbinternational.com](mailto:matthias.reith@rbinternational.com)

## GOTTFRIED STEINDL

📍 Austria  ,  
 ✉️ [gottfried.steindl@rbinternational.com](mailto:gottfried.steindl@rbinternational.com)

## BRISIDA BUZI

📍 Albania  ,  
 ✉️ [Brisida.BUZI@raiffeisen.al](mailto:Brisida.BUZI@raiffeisen.al)

## ARISTEA VLLAHU

📍 Albania  ,  
 ✉️ [Aristea.Vllahu@raiffeisen.al](mailto:Aristea.Vllahu@raiffeisen.al)

## IVONA ZAMETICA

📍 Bosnia Herzegovina  ,  
 ✉️ [ivona.zametica@raiffeisengroup.ba](mailto:ivona.zametica@raiffeisengroup.ba)

## ZRINKA ZIVKOVIC-MATIJEVIC

📍 Croatia  ,  
 ✉️ [zrinka.zivkovic-matijevic@rba.hr](mailto:zrinka.zivkovic-matijevic@rba.hr)

## GERGELY PÁLFFY

📍 Hungary  ,  
 ✉️ [gergely.palffy@raiffeisen.hu](mailto:gergely.palffy@raiffeisen.hu)

## NICOLAE COVRIG

📍 Romania  ,  
 ✉️ [Nicolae.Covrig@raiffeisen.ro](mailto:Nicolae.Covrig@raiffeisen.ro)

## ANASTASIA BAYKOVA

📍 Russia  ,  
 ✉️ [ABAIKOVA@raiffeisen.ru](mailto:ABAIKOVA@raiffeisen.ru)

## PETER BREZINSCHKE

📍 Austria  ,  
 ✉️ [peter.brezinschek@rbinternational.com](mailto:peter.brezinschek@rbinternational.com)

## CHRISTIAN HINTERWALLNER

📍 Austria  German,  
 ✉️ [christian.hinterwallner@rbinternational.com](mailto:christian.hinterwallner@rbinternational.com)

## ANDREAS SCHILLER

📍 Austria  ,  
 ✉️ [andreas.schiller@rbinternational.com](mailto:andreas.schiller@rbinternational.com)

## FRANZ ZOBL

📍 Austria  ,  
 ✉️ [franz.zobl@rbinternational.com](mailto:franz.zobl@rbinternational.com)

## VALBONA GJEKA

📍 Albania  ,  
 ✉️ [valbona.gjeka@raiffeisen.al](mailto:valbona.gjeka@raiffeisen.al)

## OLGA ZHEGULO

📍 Belarus  ,  
 ✉️ [olga.zhegulo@priorbank.by](mailto:olga.zhegulo@priorbank.by)

## ANA LESAR

📍 Croatia  ,  
 ✉️ [ana.lesar@rba.hr](mailto:ana.lesar@rba.hr)

## HELENA HORSKA

📍 Czech Republic  ,  
 ✉️ [Helena.Horska@rb.cz](mailto:Helena.Horska@rb.cz)

## ZOLTÁN TÖRÖK

📍 Hungary  ,  
 ✉️ [torok.zoltan@raiffeisen.hu](mailto:torok.zoltan@raiffeisen.hu)

## ANDREEA-ELENA DRAGHIA

📍 Romania  ,  
 ✉️ [Andreea-Elena.DRAGHIA@raiffeisen.ro](mailto:Andreea-Elena.DRAGHIA@raiffeisen.ro)

## GREGORY CHEPKOV

📍 Russia  ,  
 ✉️ [grigory.chepkov@raiffeisen.ru](mailto:grigory.chepkov@raiffeisen.ru)

## GUNTER DEUBER

📍 Austria  ,  
 ✉️ [gunter.deuber@rbinternational.com](mailto:gunter.deuber@rbinternational.com)

## HELGE RECHBERGER

📍 Austria  ,  
 ✉️ [helge.rechberger@rbinternational.com](mailto:helge.rechberger@rbinternational.com)

## MANUEL SCHLEIFER

📍 Austria  ,  
 ✉️ [manuel.schleifer@rbinternational.com](mailto:manuel.schleifer@rbinternational.com)

## PETER ÖHLINGER

📍 Austria  ,  
 ✉️ [peter.oehlinger@rbinternational.com](mailto:peter.oehlinger@rbinternational.com)

## FJORENT RRUSHI

📍 Albania  ,  
 ✉️ [Fjorent.Rrushi@raiffeisen.al](mailto:Fjorent.Rrushi@raiffeisen.al)

## ASJA GRDJO

📍 Bosnia Herzegovina  ,  
 ✉️ [asja.grdjo@raiffeisengroup.ba](mailto:asja.grdjo@raiffeisengroup.ba)

## ELIZABETA SABOLEK-RESANOVIC

📍 Croatia  ,  
 ✉️ [elizabeta.sabolek-resanovic@rba.hr](mailto:elizabeta.sabolek-resanovic@rba.hr)

## DAVID VAGENKNECHT

📍 Czech Republic  ,  
 ✉️ [david.vagenknecht@rb.cz](mailto:david.vagenknecht@rb.cz)

## DOROTA STRAUCH

📍 Poland  ,  
 ✉️ [dorota.strauch@raiffeisen.pl](mailto:dorota.strauch@raiffeisen.pl)

## IONUT DUMITRU

📍 Romania  ,  
 ✉️ [Ionut.Dumitru@raiffeisen.ro](mailto:Ionut.Dumitru@raiffeisen.ro)

## STANISLAV MURASHOV

📍 Russia  ,  
 ✉️ [stanislav.murashov@raiffeisen.ru](mailto:stanislav.murashov@raiffeisen.ru)

## LJILJANA GRUBIC

📍 Serbia   
✉ [ljljana.grubic@raiffeisenbank.rs](mailto:ljljana.grubic@raiffeisenbank.rs)

## TIBOR LORINCZ

📍 Slovakia   
✉ [tibor\\_lorincz@tatrabanka.sk](mailto:tibor_lorincz@tatrabanka.sk)

## SERHII KOLODII

📍 Ukraine   
✉ [serhii.kolodii@aval.ua](mailto:serhii.kolodii@aval.ua)

## OLEKSANDR PECHERYTSYN

📍 Ukraine   
✉ [oleksandr.pecherytsyn@aval.ua](mailto:oleksandr.pecherytsyn@aval.ua)

## Imprint

### Imprint

#### Information requirements pursuant to the Austrian E-Commerce Act

**Raiffeisen Bank International AG** Registered Office: Am Stadtpark 9, 1030 Vienna Postal address: 1010 Vienna, Postfach 50 Phone: +43-1-71707-1846 Fax: +43-1-71707-1848 Company Register Number: FN 122119m at the Commercial Court of Vienna VAT Identification Number: UID ATU 57531200 Austrian Data Processing Register: Data processing register number (DVR): 4002771S.W.I.F.T.-Code: RZBAAT WW Supervisory Authorities: As a credit institution (acc. to § 1 Austrian Banking Act; Bankwesengesetz) Raiffeisen Bank International AG is subject to the supervision by the Austrian Financial Market Authority (FMA, Finanzmarktaufsicht) and the National Bank of Austria (OeNB, Oesterreichische Nationalbank). Additionally, RBI is subject to the supervision by the European Central Bank (ECB), which undertakes such supervision within the Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM), which consists of the ECB and the national responsible authorities (Council Regulation (EU) No 1024/2013 - SSM Regulation). Unless set out herein explicitly otherwise, references to legal norms refer to norms enacted by the Republic of Austria. Membership: Austrian Federal Economic Chamber, Federal Bank and Insurance Sector, Raiffeisen Association.

#### Statement pursuant to the Austrian Media Act

**Publisher and editorial office of this publication** Raiffeisen Bank International AG Am Stadtpark 9, A-1030 Vienna **Media Owner of this publication** Raiffeisen RESEARCH – Verein zur Verbreitung von volkswirtschaftlichen Analysen und Finanzmarktanalysen Am Stadtpark 9, A-1030 Vienna **Executive Committee of Raiffeisen RESEARCH – Verein zur Verbreitung von volkswirtschaftlichen Analysen und Finanzmarktanalysen:** Mag. Peter Brezinschek (Chairman), Mag. Helge Rechberger (Vice-Chairman) Raiffeisen RESEARCH – Verein zur Verbreitung von volkswirtschaftlichen Analysen und Finanzmarktanalysen is constituted as state-registered society. Purpose and activity are (inter alia), the distribution of analysis, data, forecasts and reports and similar publications related to the Austrian and international economy as well as financial markets. **Basic tendency of the content of this publication**

- Presentation of activities of Raiffeisen Bank International AG and its subsidiaries in the area of conducting analysis related to the Austrian and international economy as well as the financial markets.
- Publishing of analysis according to various methods of analyses covering economics, interest rates and currencies, government and corporate bonds, equities as well as commodities with a regional focus on the euro area and Central and Eastern Europe under consideration of the global markets.

**Producer of this publication** Raiffeisen Bank International AG Am Stadtpark 9, A-1030 Vienna

Creation time of this publication: 28/07/2022 10:03 A.M. (CEST) ;

First Dissemination of this publication: 28/07/2022 10:03 A.M. (CEST)